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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION FOR THE USE 
AND BENEFIT OF ANDER-
SON LUMBER COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. LOYD UNDERWOOD, 
Defendant 
and PHOENIX INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF HARTFORD 
CONNECTICUT, a Connecticut 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9113 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Anderson 
Lumber Company in the name of the Davis County 
Board of Education against J. Loyd Underwood 
and Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Con-
necticut allegedly to recover for materials furnished 
the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, for the con-
struction of an addition to the South Davis Junior 
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High School. The materials were furnished through 
what has been designated the Bountiful Yard of 
the Anderson Lumber Company, which account has 
been paid and is not in question here, and what is 
designated the Ogden Yard of 'the Anderson Lum-
ber Company. 
No contention is made in this appeal that the 
materials were not furnished nor that the defendant 
Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connec-
ticut, as the bonding company for J. Loyd Under-
wood, is not responsible for the payment of those 
materials. 
The appellant, Phoenix Insurance Company of 
Hartford, Connecticut, hy this appeal seeks to se-
cure a credit for a payment of $7,713.66 which this 
appellant claims was wrongfully applied to a ndte 
of J. Loyd Underwood with Anderson Lumber Com-
pany and which note was given in payment of a 
pre-existing indebtedness on the part of J. Loyd 
Underwood to the Anderson Lumber Company and 
which indebtedness has no connection with the sup-
plying of rna terials or labor to the South Davis 
Junior High School. It is the contention of the ap-
pellant, Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Connecticut, that by the device of a note and the 
manner in which payments were applied to the pay-
ment of that note the Anderson Lumber Company 
and J. Loyd Underwood have wrongfully and un-
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lawfully defrauded the Davis County Board of Edu-
cation and the appellant, Phoenix Insurance Com-
pany of Hartford, Connecticut, of the sum of 
$7,713.66 by using moneys which should have been 
applied to the payment of materials and labor for 
other purposes, and that said sum should be allowed 
as an off-set against the cost of the materials fur-
nished by the Anderson Lumber Company. 
For the purpose of convenience we shall refer 
to the pages of the Record, other than the tran-
script, as "R. ________ ,. We will refer to the pages of 
the Transcript as "'Tr. --------"· 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This construction contract involved the sum 
of approximately $400,000.00 and was the biggest 
job which the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, had 
ever undertaken (Tr. 49). He had some difficulty 
getting a bond and in that connection it was neces-
sary for him to see various persons, including the 
plaintiff, Anderson Lumber Company, and explain 
the situation to them ( Tr. 50) . Mr. George A. Ward, 
the manager of the Ogden branch of the Anderson 
Lumber Company (Tr. 9), wrote a letter under 
date of November 2, 1955 directed to whom it may 
concern but intended for Mr. Charles Eubank, the 
insurance agent who wrote this bond on behalf of 
the defendant, Phoenix Insurance Company (Tr. 
13, 117). By that letter, which has been introduced 
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as Defendant's Exhibit 1 herein, he represented 
that J. Loyd Underwood had been a customer of 
Anderson Lumber Company for the last six years 
and that he had had credit with the Anderson 
Lumber Company recently as high as $15,000.00. 
He further reported that should Mr. Underwood 
need an extension of credit in connection with this 
job the Anderson Lumber Company was prepared to 
carry his accounts for material and millwork until 
such time as advances could be made to him on 
his contract. 
'The Anderson Lumber Company was interested 
in securing the millwork phase of the contract and 
in that connection Mr. Ward prepared bids on the 
millwork which were submitted to all the bidders 
who were bidding on the school, including J. Loyd 
Underwood (Tr. 10). The plain'tiff, Anderson Lum-
ber Company, was successful and subsequently fur-
nished the millwork in connection with the project 
(Tr. 32), which is included in the claim made by 
the Anderson Lumber Company against the defen-
dant, Phoenix Insurance Company, in this case (De-
fendant's Exhibit 2). In this connection Mr. Ward 
admits checking the specifications the architect had 
prepared for the building ('Tr. 14) and reading 
through those specifications ('Tr. 16, 51). The spe-
cifications carried a completion date for the entire 
project of September 2, 1956. 
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J. Loyd Underwood submitted a Contractor's 
Financial Statement to The Phoenix Insurance Com-
pany as of the close of business on October 31, 1955 
(Tr. 54) which has been introduced herein as De-
fendant's Exhibit 4. At that time Mr. Underwood 
owed, according to his Financial Statement, the 
sum of $7,000.00 to the Anderson Lumber Com-
pany for materials which had been furnished (Ex-
hibit 4) presumably prior to that date. These ma-
terials were all carried in an open account (Tr. 
55). 
Mr. Underwood was a't that time completing two 
other jobs, one at the Clearfield Community Church 
and the other a small retaining wall at Washington 
Terrace. He continued to purchase materials for 
these jobs. He apparently completed the Washington 
Terrace jdb prior to May 10, 1956 as it is not shown 
as being uncompleted on a Financial Statement he 
furnished as of May 10, 1956. The Clearfield Church 
job was substantially completed as of May 10, 1956 
(Exhibit 5, Tr. 59). The materials purchased for 
these jobs were charged to an open account ( Tr. 
53, 17), which was the only account which J. Loyd 
Underwood had with the Ogden branch of the An-
derson Lumber Company up to May 10, 1956. By 
May of 1956 there was approximately $11,000.00 
owing the plain tiff by J. Loyd Underwood in this 
account, the exact amount as shown by an examina-
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tion of Anderson Lumber Company's books being 
$11,485.20 (Tr. 33, Defendant's Exhibit 3). 
Between October 31, 1955 and May 10, 1956 
Mr. Underwood drew a total of $70,517.08 from 
the Davis County School Board and on May 10, 
1956 Mr. Underwood paid the Anderson Lumber 
Company the sum of $11,790.51 made up of two 
payments, one of $4,500.00 and one of $7,290.51 
('Tr. 18), leaving Mr. Underwood with a credit 
balance of $305.31 in the open account (Tr. 48, 
101). On page 62 of the transcript Mr. Underwood 
testified tha:t he could not have paid this payment 
of approximately $11,000.00 on the open account if 
the Anderson Lumber Company had not agreed at 
that time tha:t he might borrow $7,300.00 of the 
sum back again, even though he had $59,000.00 in 
the bank and owed $35,150.00, leaving a balance of 
cash on hand of about $23,000.00 to $24,000.00 
( Tr. 61). The Anderson Lumber Company had, 
however, agreed through Mr. Ward a day or two 
prior to this payment to loan the money to Mr. 
Underwood (Tr. 73, 74). 
Accordingly, Mr. Underwood came into the An-
derson Lumber Company on May 12, 1956, picked 
up a check for $7,300.00 and signed an interest 
bearing aemand note (Tr. 113-114). Although the 
Anderson Lumber Company claimed to have sup-
plied materials to the contractor, J. Loyd Under-
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wood, for the South Davis Junior High School in 
the fall of 1955 and spring of 1956 (Tr. 25), no 
specific account had been set up to identify materi-
als furnished the contractor for the Davis County 
job (Tr. 115) and no materials could be specifically 
identified as having been furnished to the contrac-
tor for that job (T1·. 40). As of May 10, 1956 a new 
account was opened in the general office of the 
company by Darrold Crawford, secretary and trea-
surer of the company, for the first time identifying 
materials furnished from the Ogden yard tD J. 
Loyd Underwood for the construction of the addi-
tion to the South Davis Junior High School (Tr. 95, 
93). This was done on directio_p.s from Mr. Ward 
who, if he was following the usual practice followed 
by the company, was acting pursuant to an agree-
ment between him and Mr. Underwood (Tr. 97). 
Both Mr. Ward, the yard manager, and Mr. Craw-
ford, the secretary and treasurer of the company, 
knew tha:t the Davis County School job, being a 
public building, was covered by a bond ('Tr. 22, 
108) . The first en try in this account was a charge 
for the alleged loan of $7,300.00 (Tr. 95, Exhibit 
2). The second entry was a service charge on this 
loan of two percent or $146.00 (Exhibit 2) which 
Mr. Ward testified J. Loyd Underwood had agreed 
to pay (Tr. 31). On the other hand, Mr. Underwood 
testified that he did not know he was being charged 
a service charge. 
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On September 15, 1956 Mr. Underwood made 
two payments, one for $1,000.00 and one for 
$3,000.00 ('Tr. 44). The $1,000.00 payment was 
applied to the account opened for the charges from 
the Bountiful yard; $827.81 of the $3,000.00 pay-
ment was applied on an open account and the re-
maining $2,172.19 was applied against the account 
opened by the Ogden yard for the South Davis 
Junior High School ( Tr. 44-45). Except as it was 
applied to the same account that the note and ser-
vice charge had been charged to, no part of these 
two payments was applied directly to the payment 
of the note or the service charge. 
The addition to the South Davis Junior High 
School was not completed on September 2, 1956 as 
provided in the contract (Tr. 51-52) and the last 
of the millwork was not delivered by the Anderson 
Lumber Company until around December 17, 1956 
(Tr. 15). By January of 19'57 Charles Eubank, the 
insurance agent of Phoenix Insurance Company in 
this case CTr. 117), began receiving telephone calls 
from creditors of Mr. Underwood who "felt that 
things were not going properly" (Tr. 118-120) and 
on about the 1st of February, 1957 he went to Mr. 
Underwood concerning the reports that he had been 
receiving (Tr. 119-120). By that time Mr. Under-
wood was in the hole, not including whatever might 
be owed to Anderson Lumber Company in this case, 
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to the extent of some $48,000.00 ( Tr. 86). 
On February 4, 1957 J. Loyd Underwood made 
a payment to the Anderson Lumber Company of 
$10,000.00 by check (Plaintiff's Exhibit B, Tr. 11). 
By this time Mr. Underwood had drawn all but 
$7,500.00 of the money due him under the contract 
with Davis County Board of Education ( Tr. 72). 
Although no demand for payment of the note 
had ever been made (Tr. 22, 105) and Mr. Under-
wood had never previously designated where the 
moneys which he paid should be applied, Mr. Under-
wood claims that he designated that this $10,000.00 
be applied first to the payment of the note of 
$7,300.00 ('Tr. 67, 68, 69). He claims tha;t he did 
this because he wanted to get rid of the interest 
(Tr. 69) even though it is admitted 'that he was 
paying interest on the account (Tr. 30). In this 
connection it is interesting to note that Mr. Ward 
testified that it was his "own individual reasoning 
... to pay that note off and stop the interest on it 
for him, and get it out of the way" ( Tr. 24) . 
Mr. Underwood produced what purports to be 
his copy of the check for $10,000.00 to which there 
is attached a voucher with the words "please pay 
note and apply balance to account" (Tr. 66, De-
fendant's Exhibit 6). An examination of Defen-
dant's Exhibit 6 shows that the writing on the 
voucher is different than the writing on the check, 
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indicating that it was written by two different per-
sons or at least at different times. Mr. Underwood's 
explanation is that he "made the check out and then 
laid my pen down and reached and picked up a 
pencil and wrote that on the top" ( Tr. 128, 129). 
Mr. Ward did not know whether this voucher was 
attached to the check at the time he received it or 
not ( Tr. 133, 134). At any rate the Anderson Lum-
ber Company was unable to find their copy of the 
voucher (Tr. 136) even though their practice is to 
retain vouchers where they have accounts with com-
panies which are doing business with a number of 
yards (Tr. 137) and it is admitted that Mr. Under-
wood was doing business with both the Ogden and 
the Bountiful yard (Tr. 137). 
Other than to deny the claims of the defendant 
Phoenix Insurance Con1pany, pl'aintiff's defense to 
those claims was based on three theories, evidence 
on which was objected to by the defendant as hav-
ing no bearing on the lawsuit but on which the court 
allowed evidence to be introduced. These theories 
were : ( 1) tha:t the prior existing indebtedness which 
was pa'id by the loan was made up in part of charges 
against the addition to the South Davis Junior High 
School; (2) that the defendant Phoenix Insurance 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut may have car-
ried 'the bond on one of the two other jobs 'being done 
by J. Loyd Underwood and that it would have had 
10 
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to pay the pre-existing indebtedness anyway; and 
(3) that the $7300.00 loan was used to pay labor 
and other costs which were incurred by J. Loyd 
Underwood in the construction of the addition to 
the South Davis Junior High School. 
Beginning on page 7 5 of the Transcript the 
following questions were asked 'by the attorney for 
the plaintiff, Anderson Lumber Company, and the 
following answers were given by Mr. Underwood: 
"Q. Now I believe you also told us in 
your direct examination during the period 
from November, 1955 to May of 1956, that 
you had two other construction jobs that were 
going? 
"A. I had two or four small construc-
tion jobs. 
"Q. But at least two? 
''A. Yes, at least two. 
"Q. And I believe it was also your tes-
timony that you had purchased and had charg-
ed to your open account with Anderson Lum-
ber Company materials that were going into 
those two other jobs? 
"A. Well, the open account, just every-
thing that I purchased went into it. 
"Q. And in addition, there were i terns 
that were going into the South Davis High 
School jdb. Is that right? 
"MR. HANSON: We object to that on the 
ground that it has already been settled by pre-
trial issue. They are 'bound by their proof 
and the only proof they have made is it was 
charged after May 10, 1956. 
11 
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"Q. Mr. Hanson, that is what I tried to 
get you to limit your testimony to this morn-
ing, but you wouldn't do it. 
"THE COURT: You may answer this 
question. 
"Q. Well, I asked you, Mr. Underwood, 
if the open account that you had with Ander-
son Lumber Company during the period of 
November, 1955 to May of 1956 included ma-
terials that you had purchased for the South 
Davis High School job? 
"A. It had. 
"Q. And also these two other jobs that 
you had going during that period of time? 
"A. Yes." 
Continuing on page 76 of the Transcript and 
relating to the proposition of whether or not the 
defendant Phoenix Insurance Company carried 
other construction bonds on some other job for J. 
Loyd Underwood, plaintiff's counsel asked the fol-
lowing questions and Mr. Underwood gave the fol-
lowing answers: 
"Q. Now drawing your attention spe-
cifically to those two other jobs, I believe you 
also mentioned to us that they were bonded 
jobs. 
''A. Two of them were, yes. 
"Q. And could you tell this jury with 
what bonding company those bonds were 
placed? 
"A. ·They were placed with the same 
12 
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agent, I don't know, I don't recall offhand, if 
it was the same company. 
''Q. Would it be your opinion that it 
would be the same company? 
"A. It would. 
"MR. HANSON: We object to any opi-
nion he may have. 
"THE COURT: You may answer if you 
know who the bonding company is. 
''A. Of my own knowledge, I would 
have to check my records to see. 
"Q. What is your best recollection? 
"A. My best recollection is that they 
were. 
"Q. With Phoenix Insurance Co.? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. The defendant here? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And in any event, they were placed 
with the same agent for Phoenix Insurance 
Co.? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. So that if the $11,000.00 which you 
paid in May of '56 was not a ppl'ied to ma-
terials on the open account that you had pur-
chased for these two other jobs, in addition 
to the materials supplied the South Davis 
High School, Phoenix would have to have dis-
charged that obligation anyway, would they 
not? 
"MR. HANSON: We object to that, Your 
13 
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Honor. It goes beyond the issues of this case. 
We are concerned here only with the one ac-
count and that is the account of the South 
Davis Junior High School. We don't have any 
evidence of the fact that Phoenix Insurance 
Co. had these other jobs. 
"THE COURT: It goes to the issue of 
what his motivation may have been. You may 
go into it for that purpose. 
"Q. I don't understand the court's rul-
ing on motivation only. 
"THE COURT: It goes to why he did 
this, why he might have made his payment the 
way he did. What direction he may have 
given. 
"Q. Perhaps we ought to argue this 
without the jury being present, one of the 
positions is that we have conspired to reroute 
monies that should have been applied-. 
"THE COURT: (Interposing) It goes 
to that issue. 
"Q. It goes to that issue specifically 
and that is why the query was made. 
"THE COURT: It goes to that issue. 
"Q. Mr. Underwood, if the $11,000.00 
paid in May of 1956 had 'been applied to other 
than this open account, -. 
"A. (Interposing) There wasn't any 
other. 
"Q. Well, supposing you had retained 
the $7300.00 instead of making the loan with 
Anaerson Lumber C o m p any and that 
$7300.00, $7290.00 had not been applied to 
14 
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the open account and had never been paid, now 
wouldn't it be a fact that that amount would 
be covered a bond with the named insurance 
company? 
''A. That I don't know. 
"MR. HANSON: We object to that. 
"THE COUR'T: The answer that he does 
not know may remain. 
"Q. Well, these other two jobs were cov-
ered by a bond with Phoenix Insurance Co., 
to your best recollection? 
"A. Yes, I was doing some that was 
and some that wasn't so that would have to 
be looked into.'' 
In regard to the third theory, that is, that the 
money had been used on the addition to the South 
Davis Junior High School anyway, plaintiff's coun-
sel asked and Mr. Underwood answered as follows 
on page 7 4 of the Transcri p't: 
"Q. Did you inform Mr. Ward here the 
purpose for which you were borrowing that 
money? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And what did you tell him? 
"A. Working capital for the job that I 
had with the School. 
"Q. The South Davis High School job? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And did you propose to use that 
money to pay the labor and materialmen? 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"A. Anything that came up. 
"Q. On the South Davis School job? 
"A. Yes." 
Within ten days of the time Mr. Underwood 
had made this last payment to Anderson Lumber 
Company he notified the bonding company that he 
was going to have to turn the matter over to them 
(Tr. 66). At that time he had about $20,000.00 in 
'the bank which was disbursed to the various cred-
itors under the direction of the bonding company 
(Tr. 80). After disbursement of this $20,000.00 
and not including the amount owed the Anderson 
Lumber Company, he owed a!bout $48,000.00 (Tr. 
86). all of which has been paid (Tr. 87, 88). 
The foregoing constitutes all of the evidence 
which the appellant herein considers pertinent to 
the questions before the court on this appeal. 
Part of our argument will be directed to the 
errors of the court in instructing the jury and the 
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in arguing the case 
to the jury, but it is felt that those matters may 
best be set out in that part of the argument to 
which they apply. 
In our Statement of Points filed herein we have 
set out nine items (R. 91) which may be consoli-
dated into 'the following Statement of Points for 
purposes of this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
THE JURY TO ALLOW DEFENDANT PHOENIX IN-
SURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTI-
CUT A SET-OFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,713.66 AND 
IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THIS DEFENDAN'T FOR 
$11,320.16. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE 
IS BASED ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND ARE BEYOND THE ISSUES DETER-
MINED BY THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
POIN'T III. 
THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY OR ADE-
QUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFEN-
DANT'S THEORY AND 'THE SPECIAL VERDICT SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY WAS SO RESTRICTIVE AS 
TO NOT ADEQUATELY COVER THE ISSUES IN THE 
CASE. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND SET 
OUT IN POINTS I 'THROUGH III, AND UPON THE 
FURTHER GROUND THAT 'THE COURT ERRED IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE WHICH WAS IMMATERIAL, 
IRRELEVANT AND OUTSIDE THE PRE-TRIAL OR-
DER AND PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WAS GUILTY OF 
MISCONDUCT IN ARGUING 'THIS EVIDENCE IN THE 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COM-
PANY AND AGAINST J. LOYD UNDERWOOD IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $12,083.57. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
THE JURY TO ALLOW DEFENDANT PHOENIX IN-
SURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTI-
CUT A SET-OFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,713.66 AND 
IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THIS DEFENDANT FOR 
$11,320.16. 
It is the contention of the defendant Phoenix 
Insurance Company that it should have been allowed 
a set-off in the amount of $7,713.66 against the 
judgment of $11,320.16 for the reason that the 
$7,713.66 should have been applied by the Anderson 
Lumber Company toward the payment of materials 
furnished the Davis County Board of Education 
through the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, and 
not to the loan or note which the Anderson Lumber 
Company held. There is no question but that the 
defendant J. Loyd Underwood was dbligated under 
his contract with the Davis County Board of Edu-
cation to pay for all labor and materials furnished 
or used in the construction of the addition to the 
South Davis Junior High School. By its bond herein 
the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Con-
necticut undertook to assure the Davis County Board 
of Education that the contractor would pay all per-
sons who would furnish labor or materials. This 
defendant, therefore, stands in the shoes of the 
Davis County Board of Education insofar as pay-
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ment for labor and materials used in the construc-
tion of the addition is concerned, and by the same 
token has the same right to have the moneys paid 
under the construction contract applied to the pay-
ment of materials and labor that the Davis County 
Board of Education had under that con traet. 
Where money is paid by one person to another 
the general rule applicable to the application of the 
payments to different debts is as stated in Section 
387 of the Restatement Of The Law, Contracts. 
"Where more than one matured contrac-
tural duty is owed to the same person and 
these duties are for performances of identical 
character, such as the payment of money, a 
payment or other performance capable of dis-
charging in whole or in part either one or 
another of these duties, is applied, subject to 
the rules stated in§§ 388-393, 
" (a) as the debtor, at or before the time 
of payment or performance, manifests to the 
creditor an intention to have it applied; or, 
"(b) if the debtor makes no such man-
ifestation, as the creditor within a reason-
able time manifests an intention to have it 
applied; or, 
" (c) if neither the de'btor nor creditor 
makes a seasonable manifestation of inten-
tion, as a just regard to its effect upon the 
debtor, the creditor, and third persons makes 
it desirable that it should be applied." 
However, if the person paying the money is 
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under a duty to a third person to devote the money 
paid by him to the discharge of a particular debt, 
the rule is as set out in Section 388 of the Restate-
ment Of The Law, Contracts. 
"If the payor is under a duty to a third 
person to devote money paid by him to the 
discharge of a particular debt the payment 
must be so applied if the creditor knows, or 
has reason to know, of the payor's duty, in 
spite of the fact that the payor directs that 
the payment shall be applied to the discharge 
of another debt." 
Cases annotated in 41 A.L.R. 1297 and supple-
mented in 130 A.L.R. 198 and 166 A.L.R. 641 an-
nounce a somewhat broader rule, stated as follows: 
"In the following cases it has been held 
that where the owner of property pays a cre-
ditor, and the latter with the proceeds of that 
payment pays a third person who has two or 
more claims against the creditor, one of which 
may ripen into a lien against the property, 
the owner (person making the original pay-
ment) may insist that such secondary pay-
ment be applied to the lienable claim in exon-
eration of his property. " 41 A.L.R. 1298. 
The reason for this rule is: 
"A reason for the rule is stated in Wil-
liams v. Willingham-Tijt Lumber Co., (1909) 
5 Ga. App. 533, 63 S. E. 584, as follows: The 
law will make the credit according to prin-
ciples of justice and equity, and will not per-
mit the money of one man to be used in the 
payment of the debts of another man, or de-
clare a lien on the property of the man who 
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has paid in full for all the material furnished 
to improve his property, and release from a 
lien the property of the man who still owes 
for the material that was used to improve 
his property." 41 A.L.R. 1299. 
Utah, however, falls within that group which 
requires that the creditor know, or have reason to 
know, of the payor's duty before impressing a duty 
on the creditor to apply the payment to that parti-
cular debt or a debt which may ripen into a lien 
against the owner's property. See Salt Lake City v. 
O'Conner, 249 Pac. 810, 68 Utah 233 and Utah State 
Building Comm. v. Great American Insurance Com-
pany, 140 Pac. (2d) 763, 105 Utah 11. -
A promise to the third person to apply pay-
ments to a particular debt where the creditor knows 
of such duty raises the obligation that the payment 
be applied to tha:t particular debt. 
"Although the right of the debtor or 
creditor to appropriate to any debt will not 
be affected by a promise to a third person 
made without consideration to appropriate to 
a particular debt, where the debtor is under 
a duty to a third person to apply a payment 
to the discharge of a particular debt, and the 
creditor knows of such duty, the payment 
must be so applied. It has 'been held that, in 
order for this rule to apply, it does not suf-
fice that the debtor is under a duty to the 
third person to pay the debt, but he must 'be 
under a duty to devote to that debt the very 
money with which the payment is made. 
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Where the debtor procures a loan on the rep-
resentation that it will be applied to the pay-
ment of a particular debt, he is estopped to 
apply the payment otherwise and the estoppel 
extends to a creditor having knowledge of the 
facts; but where the debtor fails to apply the 
payment the creditor is free to apply the pay-
ment to any debt where he is ignorant of the 
third person's rights. Where neither the d~b­
tor nor the creditor applies a payment, it has 
been held that the court will apply it to a 
rna tured debt which the debtor is under a 
duty to a third person to pay immediately 
rather than to one where he is under no such 
duty." 70 C.J.S. 282. 
The claim that the money which was loaned 
to the contractor was used to pay for labor and ma-
terial need not concern us in the consideration of 
this point. This court has held in Salt Lake City 
v. O'Conner, supra, that the claim of the surety 
who has been obliged to pay loans for material and 
labor is superior to that of the person who loans 
money to the contractor, even assuming that the 
money loaned was loaned to enable a contractor to 
pay for material and tabor furnished under the con-
tract. 
The only payment we are concerned with in 
this case is that payment in the sum of $10,000 made 
on February 4, 1957. We are not concerned with the 
application of the payments made on May 10, 1956 
or in the intervening period between May 10, 1956 
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and February 4, 1957 except as they relate to and 
show the intent of and the knowledge of the Ander-
son Lumber Company when it received the payment 
of February 4, 1957. The evidence in this case dic-
tates the conclusion that on that date the Anderson 
Lumber Company, through its representative Mr. 
\Vard, knew the source of the moneys which Mr. 
J. Loyd Underwood paid to it and of J. Loyd Under-
wood's duty to use those moneys for the discharge 
of his duty to the Davis County Board of Education 
and the bonding company in paying for the materi-
als and supplies furnished for the addition to the 
South Davis Junior High School. In fact, the evi-
dence is much stronger than th'i's and shows a course 
of dealing between Mr. Ward and Mr. Underwood 
calculated to enable the Anderson Lumber Company 
to l'ecover both its loan and the cost of material 
and supplies, which arrangement was a fraud upon 
the Davis Coun'ty Board of Education and, through 
i't, the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Connecticut. This is not a situation, as is quite often 
the case, of a contractor and a supplier dealing with 
each other at arm's length, where the supplier has 
no knowledge of the duties or obligations of the con-
tractor. All of the parts of this transaction which 
are rna terial to this case were handled on behalf of 
the Anderson Lumber Company by one man, George 
A. Ward, manager of 'the Ogden yard. He is the man 
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who on November 2, 1955 wrote the bonding com-
pany that 
"Mr. J. Loyd Underwood, General Con-
tractor, who has recently been awarded a con-
tract on the South Davis Jr. High School at 
Bountiful for the sum of $398,000.00, has 
been a customer of ours for the last six year." 
(Exhibit 1) 
He is the man who impliedly promised the 
bonding company that advances made to Mr. Under-
wood under the contract would be applied to the 
materials and millwork furnished. 
". . . Should he need some extension of 
credit in connection with this job, we are 
prepared to carry his account for materials 
and mill work until such time as advances 
can be made to him on his con tract." 
It was he who looked over the contract, pre-
pared a bid on the millwork and submitted the same 
to J. Loyd Underwood and, therefore, knew the 
details of the entire contemplated construction pro-
ject. 
Of course, Mr. Ward denies that he had any 
knowledge of the source of the $10,000 payment 
made to him on February 4, 1957 or the duty that 
J. Loyd Underwood was under to apply this money 
to the con tract of the Davis County School Board, 
which might be expected since his admission of that 
fact would have terminated this litigation. His ac-
tions, however, speak louder than his words. 
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Mr. Underwood testified that at the time he 
received this contract he was completing two 
other jobs, one at C1'earfield and one at Washington 
Terrace, and that both of these jobs were substan-
tially compl~ted as of May 10, 1956 (Exhibit 5, 
Tr. 59). Mr. Ward knew this; otherwise why was 
he so willing and anxious to have all the prior in-
debtedness of Mr. Underwood cleaned up on May 
10, 1956. Any other explanation of the transaction 
which took place on or about May 10, 1956 does not 
conform with what we know of human behavior. 
A creditor does not accept a $11,000 payment on the 
one hand and return $7,300 of that payment for 
no reason at all, and a person does not generally 
pay a creditor $11,000 and then turn around and 
borrow $7,300 of it back and agree to pay a $146 
service charge without some good reason. What 
more logical reason is there than that Mr. Ward 
knew that the other jdbs which Mr. Underwood 
had been doing were complete and wanted that in-
debtedness cleared up and Mr. Underwood, of course 
anxious to retain the good-will of the Anderson 
Lumber Company, was willing to go along with the 
proposition. 
This is further evidenced by the fact that al-
though no accounting had been opened prior to that 
time, Mr. Ward directed that an account be opened 
on May 10, 1956 to which the materials for the 
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school were to be charged and directed that the loan 
and service charge be charged to that account. It 
is significant also that Mr. Underwood told Mr. 
Ward at that time that he did not have sufficient 
other moneys available to pay for the labor to be 
performed on the school job unless part of the 
$11,000 was returned to him; therefore, Mr. Ward 
knew on that date that Mr. Underwood did not 
have moneys coming from other jobs sufficient to 
finance his operation and was entirely dependent 
upon whatever advances he might secure under the 
contract with Davis County. 
The testimony of Myron Berryman indicates 
that no other accounts were opened during the per-
iod from May 10, 1956 through February 4, 1957 
and that all of the materials furnished during that 
period fron1 either the Bountiful yard or the Ogden 
yard were furnished to the South Davis Junior High 
School. Nor does the record disclose that Mr. Under-
wood was working on any other job during that 
period of time, so that the Anderson Lumber Com-
pany knew that the only work which Mr. Under-
wood was doing and for which he, of course, was 
receiving payment was the South Davis Junior High 
School Job. Nor is there any question as to the source 
of the $10,000. Mr. Underwood's financial statement 
filed May 10, 1956 only shows a balance of $2,683.10 
due from completed contracts and $5,776.28 due 
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from the Community Church in Clearfield; whereas 
he had coming from Davis County the sum of 
$284,310.75 (Defendant's Exhibit 5), ail but $7,500 
of which he had drawn at the time the loss was re-
ported to the bonding company on or about Feb-
ruary 19, 1957 (Tr. 72), fifteen days after he had 
paid off Anderson Lumber Company. 
The Anderson Lumber Company denies that it 
knew the con tractor was in trouble even though it 
did not deliver the last of the millwork to the project 
until around December 17, 1956 (Tr. 15), months 
after the completion date of September 2, 1956 ( Tr. 
5-152), and even though the other creditors of the 
contractor began calling the insurance agent of the 
Phoenix Insurance Company in January of 1957 
(Tr. 117). 
It is also interesting to note that even though 
this was a demand note due at any time, the pay-
ments of $1,000 and $3,000 made on 'September 15, 
1956 were applied against the materials and no 
part of these payments was applied directly to the 
note or service charge. 
Another bit of information whi'ch indicates that 
Mr. vVard was advised of the true state of facts 
and deliberately applied the $7,713.66 to the pay-
ment of the note pursuant to an arrangement be-
tween him and Mr. Uunderwood that it be so applied, 
is that although he claims this was applied to the 
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note at the direction of Mr. Underwood both he and 
Mr. Underwood testified that this was done in order 
to get rid of the interest on the note and Mr. Ward 
testified that was his "own individual reasoning 
. . . to pay that note off and stop the interest on it 
for him, and get it out of the way" (Tr. 24), which 
is a direct contradiction of his other testimony that 
he played no part in designating the application to 
be made of the payments. 
Lastly, we have the evidence that the designa-
tion placed on the voucher attached to the check pay-
ing the $10,000 (Exhibit 6) shows that the designa-
tion was written at least at a different time and 
the fact that two of the three accounts which Mr. 
Underwood paid prior to notifying the bonding com-
pany that he was in difficulty was the loan at An-
derson Lumber Company and a loan at the Com-
mercial Bank, the only two accounts which would 
not have been covered by the bond in this case. It 
is admitted that this evidence is circumstantial but 
it must be kept in mind that the nature of the case 
was such that a'll of the evidence going to the know-
ledge or intent of Anderson Lumber Company had 
to be drawn from witnesses who worked for the 
Anderson Lumber Company and J. Loyd Under-
wood who, himself, was hostile and testified that 
i1t was important to him that he maintain his stand-
ing with the Anderson Lumber Company (Tr. 89). 
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The facts in this case bear a great similarity 
to those in the case of United States of America for 
the Use of H. H. Carroll v. HenTy C. Beck (U.S.C.A., 
6th Cir., December 6, 1945), 151 Fed. (2d) 964, 
166 A.L.R. 637, admittedly decided under the Fed-
eral law but which involved the same principles as 
enunciated by the Utah court in the cases decided in 
this jurisdiction. In that case Beck contracted with 
the United States to build 'the Andrew Jackson Hous-
ing project at Nashville, Tennessee and furnished a 
bond guaranteeing payment of labor and materials. 
Beck sub-let the painting jdb to Henry to be done 
under the terms of the general contract. Henry in 
turn contracted wi:th Carron for supplying him with 
paints and sundries needed in the performance of 
the contract. In addition Carroll loaned Henry 
money for payrolls on the work. Eight estimate 
checks issued by Beck payable to the order of Henry 
were endorsed by Henry, delivered to and cashed 
by Carroll under an agreement between them that 
the checks would be credited on the loans made by 
Carroll. Beck was not a party to this agreement, 
had no knowledge of it and gave no direction for the 
applica1tion of the payments. Later Carroll advised 
Beck that all estimate checks theretofore received 
had been applied on his loans to Henry made for the 
purpose of maintaining payrolls and insisted the 
last or ninth estimate check be similarly applied. 
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Beck declined, but consented to an agreement where-
by one-half of such check would be credited to the 
material account and one-half to the loan account 
without prejudice to the rights of either party in 
respeet to the application of the proceeds of the first 
eight estimate checks. The court ruled that the ap-
plication of these checks by Carroll to his loan ac-
count with Henry was prejudicial to Beck and his 
surety and that both were entitled to have such pay-
ments re-applied upon Carroll's hill for materials. 
It was also concluded that the money loaned by 
Carroll to Henry was not covered by the bond, that 
Carroll was a mere volunteer lender to Henry and 
that even though the borrowed money was used 
for Henry's payrolls and Beck knew it Carroll was 
not within the protection of the bond for the amount 
of the loan. The Circuit Court sustained this hold-
ing and said. 
"It is no doubt the general rule that 
where a de'btor owes more than one matured 
contractual duty to the same person, and these 
duties will have performance of identical 
character, the debtor may have his payments 
applied to any one of his matured obligations 
as he sees fit. Restatement, Contracts, § 387. 
But there is a limitation upon the debtor's 
power to control application, and if he is under 
a duty to a third person to devote the money 
to the discharge of a particular debt, and the 
creditor knows or has reason to know of such 
duty, then the payment must be so applied. 
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Restatement, Contracts, § 388. But it is said 
that in order to bring a contractual duty with-
in the rule of the above section, it is essential 
that the delJtor shall be under a contract with 
the thil·cl person, not merely to pay a particu-
lar debt but devote to that debt the very money 
with which payment vvas made. Comment (a) 
§ 388. The federal cases, however, generally 
deny the debtor's power to control application, 
insofar as the interests of others are affected, 
when the creditor knows where the money 
comes from. 'This is sometimes grounded upon 
abstract considerations of equity and justice, 
and sometimes upon an implied contractual 
obligation to the surety and his principal, in 
cases bearing similarity to this. R. P. Farns-
worth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., supra; 
Town of River Junction v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 5 Cir. 110 F 2d 278, 281, 134 ALR 
727; Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks, 9 Cir. 
227 F 780; United States v. Johnson, Smath-
ers & Rollins, 4 Cir., 67 F 2d 121, 122. As 
rationalized in R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. 
Electrioal Supply Co., supra ( 112 F 2d 153), 
to allow a creditor to collect an old debt out 
of the monies paid upon a contract, and to 
leave the charges for material furnished, out-
standing, is 'to the prejudice of the principal 
and the surety on the 'bond, and of other bene-
ficiaries of the bond, and if sanctioned might 
cause great injustice.' An earlier decision of 
the same court, To~vn of River Junction v. 
Maryland Casualty Co., supra, was based up-
on an implied obligation of the contractor not 
to divert money from the job. Such an obli-
gation was enforced by a reapplication of 
payments in the Columbia Digger Co. and 
Johnson, Smathers & Rollins cases, supra. 
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Delaware Dredging Co. v. Tucker Stevedor-
ing Co. 3 Cir. 25 F 2nd 44, is apparently to 
the contrary, but as pointed out in the Farns-
worth case, no question was there ra'ised as 
to whether or not the source of the money was 
known to the reci pi en t. 
"It is contended, however, that in the 
cited cases the assailed applications were made 
on pre-existing delJts which did not have 
their source in the work from which the funds 
used for payment were derived, while here 
not only the materials furnished by Carroll, 
but the money loaned by him, were both used 
in the performance of Henry's contract with 
Beck, and there was but one matured obli-
gition, namely, Henry's money debt to Car-
roll. We fail to see how these circumstances 
provide a logical basis for differentiating in 
the application of the principle determinative 
of the adjudicated cases. The logic that as-
signs priority to an older debt when no con-
siderations of justice or implied obligation 
forbid, would seem to make the doctrine there 
applied even more persuasive in cases involv-
ing concurrent dbligations. In any event, it is 
the deHtor here who has made the segregation 
of the two debts by his agreement to apply his 
payments to the one and not to the other, and 
it is fair inference that if the time element 
is 'important, the loans in substantial part, 
preceded the furnishing of rna terials. · 
''We think it entirely irnrna terial that the 
money borrowed by Henry was devoted to the 
payment of labor on the job, for even if Car-
roll had paid for labor directly instead of 
loaning money to Henry for that purpose, he 
would have been in no better position with 
respect to the funds provided by Beck in sat-
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isfaction of Henry's claim for work under 
the subcontract, for the rule is clear that one 
who loans money to a contractor, even if it 
be for the payment of laborers and material 
men, is a mere volunteer, is not subrogated 
to the rights of laborers or material men, and 
acquires no lien thereby. Farmers' Bank v. 
Hayes, 6 Cir, 58 F 2d 34, 3'7; Prairie State 
Nat. Bank v. United States, 164 US 227, 17 
S Ct. 142, 41 Led 412. 
"It is urged that the cases recognizing 
an exception to the general rule, all hold that 
the party who receives the money and applies 
the same to the prejudice of the surety, must 
have known the source of the money. Here 
it is said, the facts clearly establish that 
Carroll knew that the money paid by Henry 
came from Beck but do not show that any part 
of it came from the United States. If it came 
from independent funds of the general con-
tractor and not from payments arising out 
of the contract, the surety had no interest 
in it to be protected. It is fair inference, how-
ever, that the money used by Beck to pay 
Henry came from the United States, and that 
such inference was drawn by the court is 'im-
plicit in the findings and conclusions of the 
Master adopted by the court. The con tract 
between Beck and the United States is not 
in the record, but it is recited in the com-
plaint filed on 'behalf of Henry that final 
settlement under the contract was made as 
shown by the certificate of the Assistant 
Comptroller General of the United States, and 
it must be assumed, therefore, that other 
settlements had been made from time to time 
by similar certificates. 
"Finally, it is contended that even though 
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there may be question about the liability of 
the surety for the materia1 bill because re-
payment of the loan was not within the cover-
age of the bond, there can be no question about 
the liability of Beck. Henry, however, was a 
suhcon tractor, and his subcontract was sub-
ject to the terms of Beck's con tract with the 
government. By that contract Beck undertook 
promptly to pay all claims for labor and ma-
terials and to protect the government from 
liens. Henry knew the extent of Beck's obli-
gation to the United States, and contracted 
with Beck in subordination to it. Carroll must 
likewise be charged with knowledge of the 
obligations of both. Henry's contract on a 
government project was the basis for the 
credit extended to him by Carroll. If equit-
able considerations or the doctrine of an im-
plied obligation arising out of these circum-
stances relieves the surety from the obligation 
to Carroll on its bond, it must likewise re-
lieve Beck from obligation for money loaned 
to Henry. Any other conclusion would re-
quire that Beck, having paid Henry for work 
and materials, must again pay Carroll for 
materials furnished in order to fully perform 
his agreement with the government. Neither 
justice nor reason requires such result, and 
the adjudicated federal cases are persuasive 
precedents against it." 166 A.L.R. 637. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE 
IS BASED ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND ARE BEYOND THE IS'SUES DETER-
MINED BY THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
In its Findings Of Fact enumerated 11 through 
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15, which appear on pages 82 and 83 of the Record, 
the court merely reiterates the findings of the jury, 
and in Finding Of Fact No. 16 the court adopts 
the jury's finding as its own. If the court erred 
in failing to direct the jury to allow the defendant 
Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connec-
ticut a set-off as outlined in the argument herein-
before set out then these findings must necessarily 
fail and we will not undertake in this section to re-
iterate the reasons why we believe them to be in 
error. 
We wish at this time to invite the court's at-
tention to the Findings enumerated 7, 8, and 9. 
Finding Of Fact No. 7 reads as follows: 
"That on or about May 10, 1956, J. Loyd 
Underwood was indebted to Anderson Lum-
ber Company in the amount of approximately 
$11,485.20 for materials furnished to the ad-
dition to the South Davis Junior High School 
as well as other bonded jobs; that on or about 
May 8, 1956, J. Loyd Underwood paid An-
derson Lumber Company $11,790.51 on his 
account; that on or about May lOth Anderson 
Lumber Company made a construction loan 
to J. Loyd Underwood in the amount of 
$7300.00, as evidenced by Underwood's pro-
missory note, to be used and which was used 
as working capital for the South Davis Junior 
High School Addition." 
This Finding, prepared by the attorney for An-
derson Lumber Company and adopted by the court, 
illustrates the manner in which the court and the 
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jury (as will be pointed out in a subsequent section 
of this appeal) were led into error and contains the 
nub of the defense which the Anderson Lumber 
Company raised to the defendant's claim. The plain-
tiff, Anderson Lumber Company, until the trial of 
this action never claimed to have furnished J. Loyd 
Underwood any materials prior to May 10, 1956 
(see Defendant's Exhibit 2). The court in its mem-
orandum decision made at the time of the pre-trial 
dis-allowed certain of the items on said Exhibit 
and allowed others and arrived at the conclusion 
that the Anderson Lumber Company had supplied 
materials to the South Davis Junior High School 
in the amount of $12,083.57 and that the Phoenix 
Insurance Company was liable to Anderson Lumber 
Company in the amount of $11,320.16, reserving 
the issue of whether or not the $7,713.66 paid to 
J. Loyd Underwood on February 4, 1957 should be 
off-set against the amount due Anderson Lumber 
Company from the defendant insurance company 
(see the court's Decree on pages 85 and 86 of the 
Record). The Finding that J. Loyd Underwood was 
indebted to Anderson Lumber Company in the 
amount of approximately $11,485.20 for materials 
furnished to the addition to the South Davis Junior 
High School as well as other bonded jobs is beyond 
the issues prescribed by the pre-trial order. Were 
this the only objection to the Finding it would prob-
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ably not be prejudicial to the defendant Phoenix 
Insurance Company. 
Since it is included in the Findings we must 
conclude that the court based its decision disallowing 
the set-off in part on the fact that the $7,713.66 
had been used in part to pay the Anderson Lumber 
Company for materials which the bonding company 
would have been responsible for had the Anderson 
Lumber Company not loaned the money to J. Loyd 
Underwood. The same thing may be said of the 
finding that the $11,485.20 was paid for materials 
furnished under "other bonded jobs". Again this 
is beyond the issues as determined by the pre-trial 
order and might not be prejudicial except when read 
in connection with the testimony set out herein rela-
tive to the fact that the Phoenix Insurance Company 
of Hartford, Connecticut may have furnished bonds 
for other jobs which the defendant J. Loyd Under-
wood undertook prior to the con tract with which 
we are concerned in this case it leads us to the con-
clusion that the court adopted the plaintiff's theory 
that it made no difference whether the $7,713.66 
was wrongfully applied in this case to pre-existing 
indebtedness since the bonding company would prob-
ably be lia:ble under some other bond for this indeb-
tedness in any event. 
The finding that the "construction loan to J. 
Loyd Underwood in the amount of $7300.00, as 
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evidenced by Underwood's promissory note, to be 
used and which was used as working capital for 
the South Davis Junior High School Auditorium" 
is again completely outside of the issues of the case 
as illustrated by the Utah case of Salt Lake City 
v. O'Conner, cited above, and the Federal case of 
United States Of America for the Use of H. H. 
Carroll v. Henry C. Beck, supra, both of which have 
held that a creditor cannot recover for a loan made 
to the contractor even if it be for payment of labor 
and materials. The finding illustrates again that the 
court adopted the plaintiff's theory that it made no 
difference if the plaintiff applied the payment of 
February 4, 1957 to a loan made by the plaintiff 
to J. Loyd Underwood since this money was used 
for the payment of labor and materials for which 
the surety company would have been liable had they 
not been paid. 
The court finds in its Finding Of Fact No. 8 
"'That J. Loyd Underwood deposited all 
of the payments he received from his construc-
tion jobs in one bank account and that he paid 
all his personal and business obligations by 
checks drawn on this one bank account." (R. 
82) 
This is obviously in error. There is testimony 
in the record that Mr. Underwood only had one bank 
account ( Tr. 80) but there is no testimony in the 
record that all of the payments made by J. Loyd 
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Underwood to the Anderson Lumber Company were 
made by checks drawn on Mr. Underwood's account. 
In fact, since Mr. Underwood on May 10, 1956 
turned two checks, one for $4,500 and one for 
$7,290.51, over to the Anderson Lumber Company 
(Tr. 18), which over-paid his account by $305.31 
(Defendant's Exhibit 3), the logical inference is 
that he must have endorsed checks over to Anderson 
Lumber Company which were furnished to him. 
Had he drawn a check on his own account it would 
appear logical for him to have drawn the check in 
the exact amount of his account, which at that time 
was $11,485.20 (Defendant's Exhibi't 3). The find-
ing is obviously intended to infer that J. Loyd Un-
derwood so comingled his accounts that the Ander-
son Lumber Company could not identify the source 
of the payments which it received, and to the extent 
that the court based its decision thereon the deci-
sion of the court is in error. 
In Finding Of Fact No. 9 the court found: 
"That on or about February 4, 1957, J. 
Loyd Underwood paid to Anderson Lumber 
Company $10,000.00 which was, pursuant to 
his written direction, applied by Anderson 
Lumber Company first to pay the balance due 
on the aforesaid promissory note and second, 
the balance to J. Loyd Underwood's open ac-
count." (R. 82) 
This finding is clearly erroneous in one respect 
and 'it is not supported by the evidence in one other 
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respect. The testimony of the accountant, Myron 
Berryman, which appears on pages 40 to 48 of the 
transcript, as substantiated by the testimony of 
Darrold Crawford which appears on pages 9·3 to 
110 of the transcript, is to the effect that the open 
account was closed out by the payment of $827.81 
on September 15, 1956 ( Tr. 44) so that the only 
account which J. Loyd Underwood had on February 
4, 1957 was an account specifically labeled South 
Davis Junior High ('Tr. 42). This again is a rather 
obvious attempt to cover up the plaintiff's knowledge 
of where the funds came from and where they should 
be applied. 
As to whether or not the $10,000 was applied 
to this account upon the direction of J. Loyd Under-
wood or upon the direction of Mr. Ward, there is 
a confl'ict in the testimony. J. Loyd Underwood did 
testify that he designated the place where the money 
should be applied but Mr. Ward, in contradiction 
to this, testified that it was his "own individual 
reasoning . . . to pay that note off and stop the 
interest on it for him, and ge't it out of the way" 
( Tr. 24). This being an admission of the plaintiff's 
own employee and officer, it is believed his admission 
should control and, therefore, that the finding that 
the payment was applied at the direction of J. 
Loyd Underwood is erroneous. 
Thus it is seen that the judgment in this case 
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is based on findings which are not supported by 
the evidence but are contrary to the evidence, upon 
findings which were outside of the issues as pre-
scribed by the pre-trial order and upon conclusions 
which were not pertinent to the case and which 
should not have been considered by the court in ar-
riving at its decision. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY OR ADE-
QUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFEN-
DANT'S THEORY AND THE SPECIAL VERDICT SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY WAS SO RESTRICTIVE AS 
TO NOT ADEQUATELY COVER THE ISSUES IN THE 
CASE. 
There is a danger in special verdicts or special 
interrogatories which may appear somewhat illus-
sory but which 'is nevertheless very real, especially 
when we are concerned with the conduct of indi-
viduals. That danger is that when we consider a 
person's conduct piece-meal, that is to say act by 
act, it may be that no individual act by itself would 
appear improper or unlawful but when all of the 
facts are considered together the sum total of all 
the acts may add up to improper or unlawful con-
duct. To illustrate, let us assume a case in which 
a man was driving just a little bit too fast, was not 
keeping quite as good a lookout as he should have 
been keeping and who had consumed enough liquor 
to impair his driving ability just a bit. A jury, look-
ing at each individual act, that is whether the man 
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was negligent in driving too fast, whether he was 
keeping a proper lookout and whether he was negli-
gent in driving under the influence of alcohol, might 
very well decide that he was not negligent in each 
of these instances; whereas the same jury, if they 
considered all of the acts together, might conclude 
that the person was guilty of negtigence. Special 
interrogatories should, therefore, be broad enough 
to permit juries to view the whole conduct of the 
parties. 
In using other language, 53 Am. Jur. 7 43 says 
it this way: 
"Questions to the jury should relate to 
the ultimate facts, and no't merely to the evi-
dence on which such ultimate facts rest. 'The 
purpose of having the jury find specially on 
a particular question is to ascertain the fact 
itself, and not merely 'the evidence which may 
tend to prove it, hence, parties to an action 
have no right, under the guise of submitting 
questions of fact to be found specially by the 
jury, to require them to give their views on 
each item of evidence, thus practically sub-
jecting them to a cross-examination as to the 
entire case.'' 
In 89 C.J.S. 248 it is said: 
" ... A special issue or interrogatory is 
improper and may be refused where it does 
not call for the determination of some ulti-
mate fact, as where it relates to subordinate 
facts to be considered in deciding ·ultimate 
facts, and necessarily embraced in the finding 
of, and merely incidental to, the ultimate 
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issue, or where it is designed merely to re-
capitulate the evidence rather than to deter-
mine the facts proved by the evidence." 
The theory under which the Phoenix Insurance 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut sought to require 
the application of the $7,713.66 to the payment of 
labor and materials is set out in its Amendment To 
Answer and Cross Complaint on pages 16 and 17 of 
the Record and was in substance that the plaintiff, 
Anderson Lumber Company, unlawfully and wrong-
fully applied the $7,713.66 to a note of J. Loyd Un-
derwood to Anderson Lumber Company, wh'ich note 
was given in payment of pre-existing indebtednesses, 
and that the Anderson Lumber Company knew or 
shourd have known that the defendant J. Loyd Un-
derwood was insolvent and that the moneys paid 
to it on February 6, 1957 (the evidence showed this 
date to be February 4, 1957) were moneys received 
from the Davis County Board of Education for the 
construction of the addition to the South Davis 
Junior High School, and further that the defendant 
J. Loyd Underwood and the plaintiff, Anderson 
Lumber Company, have wrongfully and unlawfully 
conspired to defraud the Davis Coun'ty Board of 
Education and the defendant Phoenix Insurance 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut of the sum of 
$7,713.66 by using moneys which should have been 
used for the payment of materials and labor for 
other purposes. The trial court submitted the case 
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to the jury on five interrogatories which are sum-
marized as follows : 
1. Did they find that the money paid 
by Mr. Underwood on February 4, 1957 was 
received for work done on the addition to the 
South Davis Junior High School? 
2. If the moneys came from such work, 
was that source known to the Anderson Lum-
ber Company? 
3. Did Mr. Underwood direct that the 
payment of February 4, 1957 be applied first 
to the note and then to his material account? 
4. Was that transaction referred to as 
a loan of $7,300 motivated, insofar as Ander-
son Lumber Company is concerned, 'by a de-
sire to cause a debt for materials delivered to 
various jobs to appear to be paid; and did 
it further appear that the only remaining 
obligation was a good faith loan to Mr. Un-
derwood for capital to be used in the work 
at the South Davis Junior High School so 
that it might later be maneuvered that the 
bond on the South Davis Junior High School 
contract would insure against any loss on the 
Underwood account and that but for the above 
alleged 1notive no such loan transaction would 
have taken place? 
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5. Did they find it proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that the event referred 
to as a loan was in fact not a real loan but a 
mere bookkeeping method of fixing an amount 
owed on an account and so intended by An-
derson Lumber Company at the time but l'ater 
on, when !t received a $10,000 check from Mr. 
Underwood, the Anderson Lumber Company 
decided to assert the sham loan was a bona 
fide loan so that the money paid to Mr. Un-
derwood could be app'lied without an admis-
sion that it was applying part of this $10,000 
to an account for ma'teria:ls delivered to other 
buildings than the South Davis Junior High 
School? 
It is admitted that all of these have some bear-
ing on whether or not J. Loyd Underwood and the 
Anderson Lumber Company undertook to defraud 
Davis County and 'the Phoenix Insurance Company 
of Hartford, Connecticut of moneys which should 
have been applied to the payment of material and 
labor. It is submitted, however, that these are mere-
ly the evidentiary facts from which the general con-
clusion could be drawn. When we keep in mind the 
problem of burden of proof the jury, in weighing 
all the evidentiary facts going 'to this issue and not 
limifi.ng their deliberations to the evidentiary facts 
outlined in the special interrogatories, may have 
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determined the ultimate fact in favor of the defen-
dant even though they were not convinced that the 
defendant met its burden of proof in connection with 
each individual evidentiary fact submitted to them 
in 'the interrogatories. By its Requested Interroga-
tory No.7, which was admittedly not too well drawn, 
the defendant Phoenix Insurance Company under-
took to get at this broad genera] issue. This was 
denied by the court and no interrogatory undertak-
ing to get at the ultimate issue of whether or not 
the plain tiff and J. Loyd Underwood were under-
taking to defraud Davis County and the bonding 
company was given. 
Again, the defendant undertook by its Request-
ed Instructions to have the court instruct the jury 
on the ultimate question of whether or not the An-
derson Lumber Company and J. Loyd Underwood 
had undertaken to defraud Davis County and the 
bonding company of moneys which should have been 
applied to the payment of materials and supplies 
(see Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 4 and 
8), but these instructions were denied. 
This court has held that a party has a right 
to have his theory of the case submitted to a jury 
if the evidence would justify reasonable men in 
fo'llowing the theory, and in reviewing the evidence 
as to whether certain instructions should be given 
it is the trial court's duty and the duty of the re-
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viewing court on appeal to consider the evidence 
most favorable to the party requesting the instruc-
tion. See Rcckstrorn v. Williams, 282 Pac. (2d) 309, 
3 Utah (2d) 210. It is submitted that in this case 
the evidence supported an over-all inquiry 'into the 
question of whether or not the Anderson Lumber 
Company and J. Loyd Underwood had undertaken 
to defraud Davis County and this defendant in that 
the special verdict and the court's !instructions were 
so 1·estr'ictive as not to cover 'this issue. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON 'THE GROUND SET 
OUT IN POINTS I THROUGH III, AND UPON THE 
FURTHER GROUND THAT THE COURT ERREU IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE WHICH WAS IMMATERIAL, 
IRRELEVANT AND OUTSIDE THE PRE-TRIAL OR-
DER AND PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WAS GUILTY OF 
MISCONDUCT IN ARGUING THIS EVIDENCE IN THE 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
·Throughout this trial the attorney for the 
plaintiff sought to implant in the minds of the court 
and the jury that it made no difference whether or 
not the $7,713.66 had been wrongfully applied to the 
note of J. Loyd Underwood wi'th the Anderson Lum-
ber Company for three reasons: First, that if the 
money was used to pay pre-existing !indebtedness that 
indebtedness was made up in part of materials which 
had been furnished for the construction of the addi-
tion to the South Davis Junior High School; second 
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that the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Connecticut may have carried other bonds on pre-
vious jobs done by J. Loyd Underwood and that it 
would have had to pay the pre-existing indebtedness 
anyway; and third that the moneys loaned to J. 
Loyd Underwood were actually used in the construc-
tion of the addition to the South Davis Junior High 
School anyway. 
On pages 11 to 16 of this brief we have set out 
the evidence objected to. Part of the evidence was 
admitted under a theory that it went to what mo-
tivation the Anderson Lumber Company may have 
had. That such was not the intent of plaintiff's 
counsel becomes apparent when we read his argu-
ment which appears on pages 157 through 176 of 
the transcript. On page 159 of the transcript he 
argues: 
"So that the account was due Anderson 
Lumber Company as of May 10, 1956 consisted 
in part of the materials which had been sup-
plied to the South Davis School and to J. Loyd 
Underwood prior to that time. There is no 
question about that, and there is no dispute 
in this evidence on it, but in addition that 
$11,000, the porfion of it which related to 
the materials supplied to the South Davis 
High School, you remember that Loyd Under-
wood also said that that account also consis-
ted of a church job which he had. He had two 
other jobs. There was the church job that he 
testified to, and there was the job at Clear-
field, so that these three accounts, number 
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one was the church job, we'll label it. The 
number two was a construction job out in 
Clearfield, and number three was the South 
Davis High School. 
"Materials were going into those three 
jobs and that made up th'is account in the 
sum of $11,000 as it existed on May 10, 1956. 
Now, that is the testimony of Mr. Underwood, 
and he is the fellow that knows." 
On page 160 of the transcript plaintiff's coun-
sel argued: 
"Now, the important thing that I want 
you to bear in mind, and if I can't get this 
poin't over I feel that my lawsuit is in jeop-
ardy, but the important thing 'is that each 
one of these jobs was bonded. Each one of 
them; Loyd Underwood testified yesterday 
that they were bonded. He wasn't quite sure 
whether the church and the job at Clearfield 
were bonded with the Phoenix Insurance Com-
pany. There is no question that the South 
Davis job was, and there is no question that 
one of these other two was bonded with Phoe-
nix, but the main pdin't is that each one of 
them was a bonded job, and that is the sub-
stance of the testimony from Mr. Underwood 
as it existed on May 10. 
"Now, when Mr. Hanson tatks to you 
about this account be'ing unsecured, that is 
just a bunch of belly-wash. We had more se-
curity on this, or as much security on this 
as we have on this account with him right 
now. If he couldn't pay that $11,000, if Phoe-
nix can't pay tha't, we had no security on the 
$11,000 but if Phoenix Insurance Company 
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of Hartford, Connecticut is solvent, and I 
assume that national company is, we had as 
much security on that $11,000 as we could 
have, ladies and gentlemen.'' 
Beginning on page 162 of the transcript he 
argues: 
"It is tough for me to believe that. 
Now, here is one other thing that I think is 
very important at this state. This $7300 that 
Loyd Underwood obtained from us according 
to his own testimony went into that job. 
"It went into that job to pay labor and 
materialmen and was used as working capital. 
Now, what is the effect of that on th'is bond-
ing company? It is perfectly obvious that by 
Loyd Underwood paying $7300 ... 
"MR. HANSON: (Interposing) I object 
to that on the ground it is again beyond the 
scope of the evidence in this case. He admits 
that the construction loan is not covered. 
"THE COURT: He may argue that. 
"MR. ALLEN: Will you admit, Mr. Han-
son, that the construction loan is not covered 
by the bond? 
"MR. HANSON: The only objection I 
have to it is that you go in to a lot of things 
not covered by the evidence. 
"THE COURT: You may continue your 
argument. 
"MR. ALLEN: Now, the $7300 used by 
Loyd Underwood on that job, the effect of it 
was to reduce their obligation. When Loyd 
Underwood used that money to pay for rna-
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terials that went into that job and to pay 
labor that went into that jdb that worked on 
that job, that $7300 payment decreased the 
obligation of the Phoenix Insurance Company. 
So when he says he is going to be compelled 
to pay something that he isn't obligated to 
pay as a matter of equity if we are deprived 
of that $7300, ladies and gentlemen, he gets 
the benefit indirectly that he wasn't entitled 
to get. 
"THE COURT: Just a minute. The ar-
gument you are making at this time is im-
proper. It is not going 'to the modus of the 
people. The jury is reminded that under no 
circumstances could the personal loan be col-
lected from the Phoenix Insurance Company 
in this case.'' 
On page 17 4 of the transcript plaintiff's at-
torney said: 
"In other words, that it was a bona fide 
transaction that Loyd Underwood needed the 
money and that we did not improve our posi-
tion. We jeopardized it. Now, that is what 
happened on May 10, 1956. We took that 
$7300 out of secured accounts, out of an ac-
count secured by this same bonding company 
and put it into an unsecured position." 
There is no evidence in the record that the 
Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecti-
cut furnished a bond for any other job which J. 
Loyd Underwood may have had. There is a general 
statement by J. Loyd Underwood that the other jobs 
were bonded, but that he would have to check his 
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records to determine the name of the bonding com-
pany. And in answer to the specific question if the 
previous accounts were covered by a bond with the 
named insurance company Mr. Underwood answer-
ed: "That I don't know." (Tr. 77) 
The test~imony that part of the prior existing 
indebtedness was for materiaTs furnished for the 
construction of the addition to the South Davis Ju-
nior High School was outside the issues defined in 
the pre-trial order as previously pointed ou't and 
'the evidence as to what use was made of the pur-
ported construction loan to J. Loyd Underwood was 
immaterial. All of this evidence was objected to by 
couns~l for the defendant and an examination of 
the plaintiff's argument will disclose that timely ob-
jections were made to the argument by defendant's 
counsel. This evidence should have been excluded by 
the court, and even were we to admit that it was 
admissible for the purpose of showing motivation 
it could not be argued in the general way argued by 
plain tiff's counsel. 
". . . Neither can counsel in arguing a 
case to the jury make use of evidence admit-
ted for a specific purpose only, and explicitly 
limited by the court for such purpose as if 
it were general evidence for a11 purposes; he 
cannot use evidence admitted for such speci-
fic purpose for other purposes for wh'ich it 
would have been inadmissable, or argue that 
such evidence should have been admitted with-
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out qualification and was competent for all 
purposes. Comment by counsel on evidence 
excluded by the trial court is prima facie pre-
judicial and may be sufficient to cause a re-
viewing court to reverse the judgment, parti-
cularly when counsel persist in such comment 
notwithstanding admonitions by the court to 
confine his remarks to the testimony actually 
given. A new trial may be granted in extreme 
cases even though the 'trial court, upon the 
objection of the counsel for the opposite party, 
restrained counsel from continuing the im-
proper remarks. As a general rule, however, 
impropriety on the part of counsel in argu-
ment in alluding to testimony excluded by the 
court will not warrant a reversal where it is 
corrected by the action of the court or of coun-
sel himself." 53 Am. Jur. 389. 
It should be apparent that 'this evidence was 
highly prejudicial to the defendant. What more ap-
pealing argument could be made to laymen not 
schooled in the law, or for that matter to a court, 
than the argument that the defendant, an insurance 
company, was attempting to avoid an obligation 
that it would otherwise have been obl'igated to pay 
anyway. The fallacy and, of course, the prejudicial 
part of the argument is "that the insurance com-
pany would have dtherwise been obligated to pay 
the obligations anyway." 
During the course of the trial the defendant's 
counsel had moved the court that it find as a matter 
of law that the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hart-
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ford, Connecticut was entitled to an off-set of 
$7,713.66 and at the conclusion of the trial, by a mo-
tion found on pages 75 and 7 6 of the Record, counsel 
again moved the court 'that it allow the set-off of 
$7,713.66 or in the alternative that it grant a new 
trial upon the ground that the answers to the inter-
rogatories are contrary to the unaisputed evidence, 
that the court had committed errors in law in in-
structing the jury and upon the further ground 
that plaintiff's counsel had been guilty of miscon-
duct "in arguing m·atters in his closing argument 
which were not included within the evidence submit-
ted in the trial, were beyond the scope of the issues 
involved in the trial, and were intended to inflame 
or prejudice the jury against the defendant Phoenix 
Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut." This 
motion was denied by the court, erroneously, we be-
lieve, as we have attempted to point out in the fore-
going argument. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COM-
pANY AND AGAINST J. LOYD UNDERWOOD IN THE 
AMOUN'T OF $12,083.57. 
By its Answer and Cross Complaint filed here-
in the defendant Phoenix Insurance Company of 
Hartford, Connecticut cross claimed over against 
the contractor, J. Loyd Underwood, that a judg-
ment be entered in its favor and against the defen-
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dant J. Loyd Underwood for the amount of the 
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff herein. 
The court in its Decree found that the Anderson 
Lumber Company was entitled to a judgment 
against Phoenix Insurance Company in the amount 
of $11,320.16 plus interest a't the rate of six percent 
from April 8, 1957 together with $50.00 attorney 
fees and its costs incurred herein ( R. 86) . It fur-
ther found that the Phoenix Insurance Company was 
entitled to judgment against J. Loyd Underwood 
in the amount of $12,083.57, the amount which the 
court had previously found that J. Loyd Underwood 
was indebted to the Anderson Lumber Company. It 
is submitted that the judgment of Phoenix Insur-
ance Company against J. Loyd Underwood should 
be in the same amount as the judgment of Anderson 
Lumber Company against the Phoenix Insurance 
Company, that is for whatever amount this court 
on this appeaLor the District Court upon remittitur 
of this case to the District Court should find that 
judgment should be. It is believed that counsel for 
the plaintiff will concede this point. In fact, we are 
informed, although it does not appear in the Record, 
that this has already been done by a nunc pro tunc 
order of the District Court. We mention the matter 
only to fully inform this court and to keep the re-
cord straight. 
It should further be pointed out to the court 
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that the defendant and appellant, by paragraph 9 
of its Statement Of Points filed herein (R. 91), 
has conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to judg-
ment in the sum of $3,671.81 plus interest on this 
sum from April 8, 1957 at the rate of six percent 
plus $50.00 attorney fees and the costs assessed by 
the court and is directing this appeal only to the 
failure of the trial court to allow a set-off for 
$'7,713.66 or to properly instruct the jury on the is-
sues pertaining to said set-off or to grant a new 
trial on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
It is interesting to note that at the time J. 
Loyd Underwood first undertook the construction 
of the addition to the South Davis Junior High 
School on or about October 31, 1955 he was indebted 
to the Anderson Lumber Company for materials 
and supplies furnished to other jobs in the sum of 
$7,000.00 which corresponds roughly to the 
$7,713.66 which it is attempting now to apply to its 
so-called construction loan. During the course of 
the contract, including the loan, millwork, rental of 
equipment, materials and supplies, interest in mis-
cellaneous items, it charged to the account identified 
as the addition to the South Davis Junior High 
School the sum of $23,974.06 (Tr. 45) and received 
from J. Loyd Underwood a total of at least 
$25,790.51 ( T1·. 45) The evidence indicates that it 
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has applied part of this money to pre-existing indebt-
edness of Mr. Underwood and we know that on May 
10, 1956 it received the sum of $11,790.51 (Tr. 18) 
paying up all of Mr. Underwood's prior indebted-
ness and leaving him with a credit balance of 
$305.31 (Tr. 48 and 101). 
The appellant herein, Phoenix Insurance Com-
pany of Hartford, Connecticut, is making no objec-
tion to the application of that payment, nor is it 
objecting to the fact that on or a:bout the same date 
Anderson Lumber Company returned $7,300 of this 
amount to Mr. Underwood for use on the school 
project and charged this loan with a service charge 
and the subsequent interest earned by the loan to 
this account. Nor is it contended that at the time 
that this payment was received and th'is so-called 
loan was made that the Anderson Lumber Company 
knew that Mr. Underwood would subsequently de-
fault in the performance of his contract and fail 
to pay for materials furnished by the Anderson 
Lumber Company or the other suppliers. However, 
it is claimed that on February 4, 1957 when Mr. 
Underwood was in serious financial difficulty this 
so-called construction loan was used as a device by 
Mr. Ward of the Anderson Lumber Company and 
Mr. Underwood by which they seek to have $7, 713.6'6 
of a $10,000 payment made by Mr. Underwood on 
February 4, 1957 applied to the payment of this 
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so-called construction loan so that it might in turn 
recover this amount from the bonding company 
which furnished Mr. Underwood's performance bond 
under the guise of recovering for materials and 
supplies furnished to the construction project. 
The authorities hold that if at the time it re-
ceived this $10,000 payment the Anderson Lumber 
Company knew, or had reason to know, of Mr. Un-
derwood's obligation to apply this payment to the 
discharge of his obligations for materials and sup-
plies it was dbligated to so apply the payment re-
gardless of any designation made either by the 
company or by Mr. Underwood. The Anderson Lum-
ber Company denies that it knew or had reason to 
know of Mr. Underwood's obligation to so apply 
these funds, but all of the evidence indicates, as 
strongly as evidence can indicate where it must by 
reason of the nature of the case he drawn from ad-
verse witnesses who are the only persons who are 
actually able to say what they knew at the time, 
that the Anderson Lumber Company through its 
representative Mr. Ward knew the source of the 
moneys which Mr. Underwood turned over to it on 
February 4, 1957, knew of his obligation to apply 
this money on materials and supplies furn'ished to 
the addition to the South Davis Junior High School 
and that it and Mr. Underwood sought_ to apply 
this money to the payment of the so-called construe-
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tion loan knowing that were it successful in this 
regard the balance of the moneys owed by Mr. Un-
derwood could be recovered from the bonding com-
pany, the Phoenix Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Connecticut, defendant and appellant herein. 
The Anderson Lumber Company, of course, de-
nies this knowledge but the evidence shows that it 
had been acquainted with Mr. Underwood for six 
years prior to his undertaking this job, tha:t it knew 
the details of the construction contract and were 
instrumental in helping Mr. Underwood secure a 
bond, assuring the bonding company that advances 
received under the contract would be applied on its 
account for materials and sup p 1 'i e s furnished. 
Through Mr. Ward it knew Mr. Underwood had only 
had two other small construction projects which 
were in the process of completion on October 31, 
1955 and substantially completed on May 10, 1956, 
at which time it required that he pay for the ma-
terials furnished to these jobs even though it had 
to in effect loan him part of the money from which 
he made this payment. On February 4, 1957 when 
Mr. Underwood paid the $10,000 payment involved 
here'in he was five months behind in the performance 
of his contract with the Davis County School Board 
and the other contractors were already contracting 
the agent of the bonding company in respect to their 
accounts. The Anderson Lumber Company would 
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have us believe that it was not aware of this situa-
tion even though it did not finish installing the mill-
work under its contract until December 17, 1956, 
over three months after the en tire contract was to 
have been completed. It would have us believe that 
on February 4, 1957 Mr. Underwood mailed it the 
$10,000 check and told it to apply the money to the 
so-called construction loan even though its own agent, 
Mr. Ward, testifies this was applied on his own 
individual reasoning with the intent of cutting off 
the interest on the note. 
Mr. Underwood was, of course, naturally in-
terested in seeing the Anderson Lumber Company 
come out whole and of the three accounts which he 
paid prior to notifying the bonding company on or 
about February 19, 1957 of his difficulty two, in-
cluding the Anderson Lumber Company, were for 
loans which would not have been covered under the 
bond. 
Nor is there any question as to the source of 
this money. The contract with the Davis County 
School Board was for $400,000.00. On May 10, 1956 
Mr. Underwood, even though he had drawn 
$70,517.08 from the Davis County School Board (Tr. 
18, did not have sufficient moneys to pay the 
$11,485.20 to the Anderson Lumber Company with-
out being first assured that it would loan him $7,300 
of this sum back and even at that time did not have 
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$10,000 owed to him on uncompleted contracts. 
The Anderson Lumber Company undertook to 
defend this action on a theory having a very good 
emotional appeal to the judge and jury but on one 
not founded in the law. It said in effect that the 
bonding company should be required to pay the 
$7,713.66 for the reason that part of the materials 
furnished prior to May 10, 1956 may have gone into 
the Davis County School project anyway so that 
the bonding company was merely paying for some-
thing that i't woul'd have had to pay for anyway. 
Along this same line it was successful in getting 
evidence into the record that th'is particular bonding 
company may have furnished other bonds to the de-
fendant J. Loyd Underwood wHich 'the Anderson 
Lumber Company might have been able to recover 
under had it not elected to charge the so-called con-
struction loan to this account, and said further that 
the so-called construction loan was used by J. Loyd 
Underwood to pay for materials and supplies and 
that had he not secured it from the Anderson Lum-
ber Company he would merely be indebted that much 
more for materials and supplies which the bonding 
company would have to pay. 
The trial court went a:long wfth the plain tiff 
on this theory as evidenced by its allowing intra-
duction of evidence pertaining to this theory which 
was wholly immaterial and irrelevant and as evi-
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denced further by its Findings of Fact and Con-
clus'inons of Law which incorporate this evidence. 
The defendant Phoenix Insurance Company believed 
this course of conduct on the part of J. Loyd Under-
wood and the Anderson Lumber Company to be a 
fraud upon it and the Davis County Board of Educa-
tion and by its Requested Interrogatories and In-
structions sought to present that ~ssue to the jury. 
The trial court denied the defen'dant its right to have 
the jury pass upon its theory and chose only to sub-
mit to them interrogatories going to isolated eviden-
tiary facts which were only a part of the ultimate 
conclusion as to whether or not J. Loyd Underwood 
and Anderson Lumber Company had undertaken to 
defraud the Davis County Board of Education and 
the Phoenix Insurance Company. 
Plaintiff's counsel very adroitly under the guise 
of speaking to matters which might have a beating 
on the motiva·fion of Anderson Lumber Company and 
over the objection of opposing counsel, and even 
after having been told by the trial court at one time 
to desist, framed an argument based on the imma-
terial and irrelevant evidence he had been able to 
inject into the Record; and after having so done 
there appeared to be no question that a jury, not 
being versed in the requirments of the law, would 
answer the interrogatories in a manner which would 
permit a decision for the plaintiff. The defendant 
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and appellant herein has, by a motion directed to 
the court's power to set aside the verdict and allow 
the set-off as a matter of law or to grant a new trial 
on this issue, given the trial court the opportunity 
to correct the errors it committed and to enter a 
judgment according to the law and the evidence 
herein. The trial court has chosen not to do so. 
It is submitted that justice and equity in this 
case require that this court allow the set-off of 
$7, 713.66, but if the court should not be convinced 
by the evidence then it is submitted that the court 
should grant to the defendant Phoenix Insurance 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut a new t:rial on 
the issue of whether or not this set-off should be 
allowed so that a jury might be allowed to pass on 
the ultimate issue at hand without having before 
it matters outside the issues involved which are-
highly prejudicial to the defendant and appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON AND HANSON 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Appellant 
623 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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